proceedings.
7 In relation to facial mapping 8 -that is, the comparison of images for the purposes of helping to establish identity-cases such as R 13 and R v Gardiner 14 support the proposition that 'a suitably qualified expert with facial-mapping skills may properly give opinion evidence of his comparison of images from the scene, enhanced or otherwise, and a reasonably contemporary photograph of the accused'. 15 Any dangers, such as unreliability, exaggeration and misrepresentation, are issues going to the weight assigned to the opinion at trial.
Because English courts have adopted a particularly liberal approach to the admissibility of incriminating expert opinion, including facial-mapping evidence, 16 'Mr
Neave's expertise in his field was accepted' and the appeal in Atkins was limited to the use of the following graded scale (taken from an article by Bromby). The question confronting the Court of Appeal in Atkins concerned Neave's 'expression of the level of support'-between '"it lends support" and "lends strong support"'-to the question of whether the accused (Dean Atkins) is the person in low quality incriminating CCTV images. There was, as Neave conceded, no database of facial features facilitating his move from noting apparent similarities between the images of Atkins and the perpetrator, to a conclusion about their significance. Nevertheless, the court explained:
… that where a photographic comparison expert gives evidence, properly based upon study and experience, of similarities and/or dissimilarities between a questioned photograph and a known person (including a defendant) the expert is not disabled either by authority or principle from expressing his conclusion as to the significance of his findings, and that he may do so by use of conventional expressions, arranged in a hierarchy, such as those used by the witness in this case and set out … above.
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Such 'conclusions' are admissible provided their status as 'subjective opinion' is 'made crystal clear to the jury charged with evaluating them'. 19 The absence of an 'expertise-based justification' and lack of a database does not prevent a properly qualified expert from proffering an opinion about the identity of the person in incriminating images whether as similarities or in more positive terms.
While it might be thought that this approach is reasonable and that facial mappers should be entitled to express inculpatory opinions-and even though here we are primarily concerned with the Court of Appeal's approach to 'level of support' scales-there are good reasons to doubt the reliability of much photographic comparison evidence. It should not be thought that fundamental epistemological problems can be overcome simply by recourse to 'conventional scales', putatively 'cautious' forms of practice or through the disclosure of problems-such as Neave's many concessions. The failure to test the technique, or to have a clear idea about limitations and levels of error, means that many purported similarities are simply of unknown significance.
Like(rt) magic: expressions of confidence
Although the Atkins court excused the absence of a database, provided the absence is made 'crystal clear' to the jury, this concession does not allow us to move from apparent (or alleged) similarities to reliable opinions about identity. The significance of a database is that, were one available, it would facilitate this transition in a meaningful manner and do so with some understanding of the limitations of any conclusions.
(a) Similarities and differences: what a difference a database makes
At the heart of Atkins is the significance of apparent similarities and the alleged absence of differences between the images of Atkins and the perpetrator (see Fig. 1  below) . 20 The question of whether we can be confident about similarities and differences logically precedes the question of what significance might be attached to actual similarities (and/or differences). The failure to produce a credible and reproducible technique for overcoming image distortions or to recognise the limitations imposed by image resolution (and other 'risk factors') means that we cannot be confident that alleged and apparent similarities (or differences) accurately represent the underlying reality.
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Assuming that photographic interpretation was reliable (i.e. there was some demonstrated means of overcoming or eliminating the range of distortions and factors that affect reliability), what does it mean when we speak of similarities and differences?
22 Here, the issue of databases of facial features and extrapolations from similarities assumes significance. To be useful, a database would include measurements or standardised descriptions of the features from each of a large number of faces sampled from several different population groups.
23 Such a database would allow us to estimate how frequently a particular feature occurs in the relevant population and, critically, how often two or more features co-occur. This latter aspect is especially important. In order to derive any conclusions from the observation that images share more than one feature in common we must know about the degree of statistical independence of these features in the relevant population. 24 For example, it may be that a particular nose shape is often associated with a particular upper lip shape. In this case, the observation that both features occur tells us little more than the observation of either feature on its own. English (and Australian) facial mappers do not possess such a database and, without such or in the absence of testing, cannot confidently draw conclusions from patterns of similarities or differences in images.
To be clear, the court in Atkins is discussing the meaning of similarities in terms of the identification of Dean Atkins. That is, how does the person comparing images move from similarities to a level of confidence expressed as a 'level of support' for the proposition that two or more images are of the same person (or different persons-i.e. exclusion). Indeed, this is the question it formally addresses: What is contended [by the appellant's barrister] is that it was impermissible for the expert to say that in his view those similarities lent something between support and strong support to the allegation that the man in the camera shot was Dean Atkins. … It is contended that such an expert should never use any of these expressions but should be confined to identifying the similarities or dissimilarities between the faces compared.
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And, Mr Neave told the jury that he used these five different forms of expression. In the present case, he said that in his opinion the similarities which he had identified gave support to the proposition that the man on the camera was Dean Atkins which he put somewhere between 'the top of (3) and into (4).' This part of his evidence, as summarised by the judge, was in these terms: 'This comparison therefore offers a level of support for the allegation that Dean Atkins and the offender are one and the same person, between "it lends support" and "lends strong support" to that conclusion. But you should remember this, that, as Mr Neave conceded, there is no database which would enable him to give a statistical analysis and so his scale is based on his own experience and expertise and, he added, in this case on the fact that he was able to exclude a large number of people, including one who was very similar to Dean Atkins, his brother Michael.'
26
The lack of a database with which to interpret the significance of particular combinations of facial features is noted but excused and left to weight. 27 The absence of a database or some other credible method of assigning significance to purported similarities means the observer has no reasonable basis on which to draw conclusions about identity.
28 This makes it necessary to invent a value (like 'lends strong support'), which is simply a subjective summation (or impression) lacking methodological rigour.
Rather than focus on limitations inherent in the process by which the observer moves from alleged similarities to identification, the effect that apparent similarities and intuitive interpretations might have on the accuracy of the witness's conclusion, or the decision-making of lay fact-finders, courts simply require the absence of a database-and not necessarily the significance or implications of its absence-to be made transparent.
… the absence of a database is in particular a matter which must be explained unequivocally to any jury considering such evidence.
29
And, On principle, we accept the caution with which any expression of conclusion in relation to evidence of this kind (and others) needs to be approached. We agree that the fact that a conclusion is not based upon a statistical database recording the incidence of the features compared as they appear in the population at large needs to be made crystal clear to the jury. But we do not agree that the absence of such a database means that no opinion can be expressed by the witness beyond rehearsing his examination of the photographs. An expert who spends years studying this kind of comparison can properly form a judgment as to the significance of what he has found in any particular case.
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This means that where the witness concedes that there is no database-so that their opinion is not probabilistic in any empirical sense-they are nevertheless allowed to present a subjective incriminating opinion about the significance of purported similarities because of their extensive experience:
… as Mr Neave conceded, there is no database which would enable him to give a statistical analysis and so his scale is based on his own experience and expertise … 31 (b) Problems with recourse to the Bromby scale: detailing the Emperor's clothes In Atkins we are told that the images were partial, fleeting and of poor quality. Nevertheless, the witness concluded that: … he could find no difference between the photograph of Dean Atkins and the CCTV image on morphological examination and identified particular similarities in eight different areas, of which the principal were nose, mouth, upper lip and chin. The camera angles from which the photograph and the CCTV image were taken were virtually identical and thus sufficient to enable grid measurements to be made. These were also consistent with the photograph of Dean, and so was the product of the two superimposition or substitution tests.
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In the absence of a database and a set of procedures or standards for interpreting photographs, we can only speculate about how photo comparison witnesses transform apparent similarities (and lack of differences) into a level of confidence about whether the person of interest is the suspect/accused.
Given the lack of a suitable database, the problem is on what basis can a witness move from the interpretation of apparent similarities between person(s) in two (or more) images to making claims about the meaning of those apparent similarities. Actually, this predicament is neatly summarised by counsel for Atkins:
… the absence of any database cataloguing the numbers of persons with particular facial features or measurements meant that there was no expertise-based justification for his expression of the level of support which that comparison gave to the allegation that the man in the photograph was Dean Atkins.
33
As cursory inspection suggests, and the Court of Appeal confirms, the images available for analysis in Atkins were of low resolution and 'far from clear to the naked eye'.
34 Nevertheless, the facial mapper was willing-on the basis of a few apparent similarities (of unknown frequency or independence), an apparent inability to discern any dissimilarities, and practical indifference to the many 'risk factors' (some of which were conceded)-to testify that there were only similarities between the incriminating image and a reference image of Dean Atkins. Neave concluded that the incriminating image 'lent support' or 'strong support' to the contention that it was Dean Atkins at the crime scene. Here there is an implicitly unproblematic move from limited similarity to a conclusion about identity (or individualisation). In the absence of information about the frequency with which particular facial characteristics occur in the population, or how commonly these features exist in combination, the witness was prepared to say that one or more of the very low quality images provided 'support' or 'strong support' to his conclusions about identity.
Not only is there a conceptual problem in moving from one or more apparent similarities to identity, there is also the serious question of what kind of evidence might properly ground support, let alone 'strong' and 'powerful' support. 35 The absence of an articulated and validated method, the inability to address the frequency of facial features, or even address, let alone overcome, the reliability issues suggest that the level of confidence apparent from the witness's use of the Bromby scale is not merely misguided, but misleading. We should not quibble over semantics or underestimate the significance and potential unfair prejudice of incriminating opinion evidence in the adversarial criminal trial. In the context of serious criminal proceedings a person with long experience as a medical artist, who had previously been allowed to express opinions about similarities and identification, was qualified as an expert and allowed to express the opinion that images of a person from a crime scene lent support to the Crown contention that Dean Atkins was the perpetrator.
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Regardless of any claims to the contrary, this evidence was presented and likely understood as positive identification evidence whereas, in reality, all the witness's analysis tells us is that his interpretation of the shapes drawn from the images of the perpetrator does not match the appearance of Atkins' brother Michael, their co-accused Carty, and a small number of known burglars living in the vicinity of Uxbridge. 37 Neave cannot know, and so does not tell us, how many other individuals are likely to possess the apparent features noted in the images. It may be that many men in the United Kingdom would match this image, or it could be that no other person does so, but the jury were told that only Dean Atkins could not be excluded. Neave might not have positively identified the accused but he could see only similarities between Dean Atkins and the person of interest. To put this another way, he could discern no differences and the photographic evidence, according to this experienced practitioner, 'lent support', at the very least.
Facial mappers may choose to employ the Bromby scale in an attempt to make their opinion appear more scientific. 38 However, recourse to this scale makes the absence of an underlying method more conspicuous. In some ways the illusory precision of the scale creates problems for the witness. Had Neave instead expressed his own intuitive impression, in his own words, this might have been even more difficult to contest. Unwittingly, recourse to the Bromby scale serves to reinforce the very serious methodological flaws and limitations with photographic comparison evidence and expertise.
In some ways Neave's description of the process by which he superimposed grid squares on the various images parallels the illusion created by the Bromby scale.
Use of the grid implies a level of precision (whether anthropometric or morphological) that is also without foundation. In the absence of a credible means of overcoming photographic distortion and other forms of unreliability, how can the witness be confident that the features in each of the grid squares accurately represent what the person of interest actually looks like? Can we, for example, meaningfully compare the forms in the grid squares-whether individually or in combination? Once again, a seemingly scientific apparatus, the grid, lends the appearance of precision.
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In the end the inability to overcome distortion in conjunction with the lack of a database means that all the witness can say is that in his opinion parts of the mouth, nose and chin appear similar in these partial, poorly resolved images. The absence of information about the frequency of facial features individually or in combination means that the witness cannot take this purported 'match' evidence any further.
To draw an analogy, imagine that a biologist presented DNA evidence along the lines that her analysis 'lent very strong support' to the conclusion that a badly degraded trace sample yielding a partial profile came from the defendant because it showed several similarities to a reference sample taken from the defendant and she was unable to discern any differences between the samples. Now imagine that under cross-examination this biologist conceded that she knew nothing about the extent of the degradation of the sample and how its quality affected the reliability of her conclusions, had no knowledge of the frequency of the features in the partial profiles (apart from what she had encountered in her laboratory work), and that there was no data in existence which allowed her to estimate the frequency with which the partial profile appeared in the population. 40 It is highly unlikely that such evidence would be presented to a jury, even with the proviso that the jury be told about the lack of a database and the opinion being experience-based. Why then do courts choose to admit opinion evidence of a similar quality when it concerns visual identification from images?
Perhaps the difference lies in our relative experience with biological trace evidence and faces. We are all, to some degree, experts in face recognition (and experienced with photographs and film via engagement with media and advertising). However, familiarity with faces may encourage experts and judges (and jurors) to underestimate the difficulties involved in facial and photographic comparisons.
41
Because most of us know relatively little about DNA, it is easy to see that comparison is complicated and that in order to make meaningful probabilistic conclusions regarding identity, we must employ standardised techniques and make reference to databases (and assumptions about populations).
42 However, empirical research indicates that facial comparison is also complicated and, when it comes to strangers, surprisingly inaccurate.
43 Moreover, empirical research suggests that extraneous cues, such as circumstantial evidence or the opinions of an expert, are likely to dramatically affect assessments regardless of their reliability. 
Burden shifting: substituting concessions and excuses for validity and reliability
Rather than require the Crown actually to obtain opinions using demonstrably reliable methods and repeatable techniques, trial and appellate courts have exhibited a willingness to allow the incriminating opinions of investigators to go before the jury on condition that some limitations-such as general problems with image reliability or the lack of a database-are disclosed. This obliges the defence to negate the speculative, though purportedly cautious, opinions of experts rather than require the experts to demonstrate to the court that they can actually do what they claim. The decision in Atkins exemplifies the substitution of concessions and excuses for validation studies and other indicia of reliability.
45
In Atkins the witness makes numerous concessions. These include:
In evidence before the jury Mr Neave identified nine different factors which could affect the reliability of his exercise. Many related to the quality of the photographs and the various things which could affect that. Another was pixilation, which is or can be image compression when a photograph is transferred to a computer. Two more of his stated risk factors were:
i) the possibility that two different people may appear indistinguishable; and ii) the fact that there exists no database of facial characteristics.
He also dealt with the particular quality of the CCTV photograph of the offender, which was significantly limited by short duration, some element of distortion at one edge, shadow and the sudden change from dark to light when the door was opened and the person appeared with light to one side beyond him.
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An observer might wonder at what point the cumulative effect of these concessions (or 'risk factors') actually prevents photo comparison witnesses from proffering expert opinions. In the absence of serious testing, published studies, documented means of overcoming image problems, attempts to develop databases or other means of assuring accuracy, allowing photo comparison witnesses to testify is not unlike admiring the performance of the weavers in Hans Christian Andersen's The Emperor's New Clothes. As it turns out, the mere concession of problems, like the 'self-certified' ability of the 'weavers', is not enough.
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Concession does not inoculate against unreliability (or the very real risk that the jury might misuse the opinion).
48 Ordinarily, conceding serious and persistent problems will provide a basis for the exclusion of evidence rather than a justification for admission.
In addition, it is important to stress that the 'technique' used by the witness in Atkins is not a standardised process but rather an incoherent amalgam of axioms, commitments, descriptions and practices. Moreover, claims about the ability to exclude, like claims made for superimposition and substitution 'tests', are misleading.
49 The inability to explain how 'risk factors' are credibly managed means that additional 'tests' merely compound the existing limitations or inspire inappropriate confidence rather than provide additional or independent checks. Many of the 'techniques', whether dependent on quantification or qualification, assume that image distortion is overcome-without explaining how-and that the observer can make sense of resulting similarities and differences experientially.
A few additional points are worth making. First, the various concessions (in Atkins and elsewhere) appear to have emerged largely in response to cross-examination and criticism by defence experts (and others) rather than through study or experimentation. Few seem to have been volunteered by facial mappers. Secondly, making concessions does not overcome the problems inherent in the concessions. If there are image reliability problems and there is no method for overcoming them, then why should we be interested in apparent similarities between images? Similarly, while it is important to acknowledge the lack of a database, acknowledging its absence does not provide a credible basis for allowing the witness to express an opinion that ought to be derived from a database or some other empirical foundation. Thirdly, Neave contends that the camera angles and perspectives used to obtain the reference photos were 'virtually identical'.
50 Just how similar they need to be is not explained or disclosed. This is one of the problems with the 'technique'. How does the witness know they are taken from the same angle and with the same lens? Is it supported by the appearance of similarities in the various images and therefore tautological? How different do the angles, lenses and lighting have to be before the exercise is invalid or unreliable? Even a cursory examination of the reference images used by the analyst reveals that the photographs of the Atkins brothers and their co-accused, Carty, are not identical in circumstance or orientation. In the reference photograph of Dean Atkins, supposedly a facial profile, both eyebrows can clearly be seen. The reference photographs of Carty and Michael Atkins are taken from a side perspective whereas in the reference photograph of Dean Atkins the neck is turned away to simulate that appearance. Do these differences matter and if not why not? How much variation can be tolerated before the comparisons lose any reliability? Fourthly, it is common practice for those engaged in photographic comparison to be told who the police believe the perpetrator is and to be given only two sets of images to compare. In the absence of 'blinding', experts are likely to be biased by this information. There is compelling evidence that even experts from established fields with quite elaborate formalised methods and training encounter difficulty in overcoming such influences. 51 Fifthly, the witness's 'technique', axioms and approach are rhetorically based on some of the approaches now routinely applied to DNA evidence. However, such parallels have limitations. For photographic evidence might in some circumstances lead to a positive identification (especially when familiars are involved or discriminating features such as the appearance of very unusual scars, blemishes or tattoos are not in dispute).
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In practice, substituting concessions (or declarations of inabilities) for evidence of validity and reliability effectively imposes a reverse onus upon the defence. Rather than require the Crown to demonstrate that incriminating expert opinion evidence has probative value, incriminating opinions are admitted and left to the defence to negate. Rather than exclude unreliable expert opinions and expert opinions of unknown probative value, English judges leave incriminating opinion to the trial and the fact-finder. They place great faith in a range of formal protections (such as defence lawyers, cross-examination, opposing experts and judicial directions), the lay jury and appellate courts.
53 Admissibility jurisprudence and discretionary exclusions are rarely invoked to exclude incriminating opinion evidence of unknown probative value notwithstanding the dangers of unfair prejudice to the accused. 54 In consequence, the accused is confronted with incriminating opinion of unknown reliability in the context of a circumstantial case. The incriminating opinions are admissible on the condition that defects, arguably fundamental and irreparable defects, are disclosed. This makes no sense with regard to opinion evidence used routinely in the investigation and prosecution of crime, especially where it could be tested for validity and reliability.
Appellate courts defend this stance on the basis that there are many areas of forensic science where there is no database and other experts are routinely permitted to express opinions.
That conclusion is consistent with the practice of experts in a number of fields to use this kind of scale of expressions of opinion. Such expressions are commonly encountered, as counsel on both sides confirmed and our own experience suggests, in many other fields of comparison. Some random examples are comparisons of handwriting or fibres, glass fragments or footwear patterns. In some of those there is some, often very incomplete, data about the incidence of general occurrence; in others there is no database.
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However, the fact that courts have traditionally allowed opinion evidence of unknown, and frequently questionable, epistemic provenance should not be used as a basis for the continued admission of incriminating opinion evidence. On this point it is useful to contrast English laissez-faire with recent critical work emanating from the United States and Canada.
Finally, the existence of other incriminating evidence-like the provision of similarity evidence on previous occasions-should not be used to support the admission of incriminating expert opinion evidence. Incriminating expert opinions need to be assessed on their own terms.
57 Either the expert can do what he or she claims, and can provide evidence to support that contention, or they cannot. The absence of evidence necessarily raises questions about expertise.
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Long experience is not enough where there is a reasonable expectation that the witnesses would have actually undertaken studies, published results or tested themselves. 59 Almost two decades after (Neave appeared in) Stockwell, it is not enough to just identify problems about which to warn juries. Rather, courts, prosecutors, investigators and the institutionalised forensic sciences must be more proactive. It would be relatively straightforward for facial mappers (and specialist photo comparison witnesses) to conduct proper tests of the reliability of their evidence, and such tests should be seen as a minimum requirement for the presentation of this evidence. 60 Similarly, it is not unreasonable to expect that over the last 20 years those working with images should have drawn up a set of standard operating procedures designed to minimise error and should be in a position to provide some information about the confidence intervals surrounding their conclusions. 61 Courts would then be in a position to determine what level of reliability is acceptable and how to present the evidence to jurors rather than excusing incriminating opinions because the state and the experts are unwilling to undertake the necessary research.
In the meantime, if it is not possible to describe procedures for comparing images that are demonstrably reliable, then that would seem to provide a proper basis for the exclusion of expert photographic comparison evidence. The premium placed on liberty, fairness and factual rectitude means that the accusatorial criminal even be problems in leaving incriminating images before lay juries. We cannot simply assume that fact-finders are capable of overcoming some of the illusions created by image distortion, particularly in the context of a criminal trial where photographic interpretations are likely to be influenced-consciously and unconsciously (and perhaps irrationally)-by supplementary information.
While courts are obviously free to disregard mainstream approaches to scientific research and expertise, they do so at considerable peril. Moreover, where they do disregard orthodox methodological approaches they should have good reasonspreferably good institutional reasons consistent with legal principle and institutional values. In the accusatorial trial it is becoming increasingly difficult to understand the continued admission of photographic comparison evidence given: the state carrying the burden of proof; growing concern that defence mechanisms do not consistently identify, expose or convey problems with expert opinion; empirical concerns about jury comprehension and image interpretation; along with the ability actually to assess the proficiency of photo comparison analysts. It might be timely for senior judges (or legislators) to begin to review their approaches to incriminating expert opinion in ways that embody the values of an accusatorial system and the best advice of scientists (and empirical researchers).
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In the absence of any indication of the reliability or validity, and given the concerns we have raised about the unjustified assumptions underlying this evidence, it is appropriate to be sceptical about its probative value. There are good reasons to exclude this evidence on the grounds of unwillingness or inability to demonstrate validity and reliability, inability to overcome (as opposed to recognising and conceding) problems, the speculative nature of the expressions, and the fact that witnesses tend to be biased by the way they are introduced to the images and undertake their comparisons. The issue of attaching significance to similarities raised in Atkins is a problem, but it is just one of a myriad of serious and unaddressed problems that have become part of the way police, lawyers and courts in England (and elsewhere) approach photographic comparison evidence.
'But he doesn't have anything on!' said a little child. 'Good Lord, listen to the voice of the innocent,' said the father. And one person whispered to the next what the child had said. 'But he doesn't have anything on!' the entire crowd cried at last. The Emperor cringed, because he thought they were right, but then he reasoned, 'I have to make it through the procession.' He held himself even prouder than before, and the chamberlains walked along carrying the train that was not there at all.
